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REEVALUATING SHAREHOLDER VOTING
RIGHTS IN M&A TRANSACTIONS
AFRA AFSHARIPOUR ∗
Introduction
Shareholder voting plays a central role in corporate governance. Yet, for
many public company acquisition transactions, only the target firm’s
shareholders can exercise voting rights under corporate law. The lack of
voting rights for shareholders of the acquiring (or bidder) firm is potentially
problematic given anecdotal and empirical evidence that a large percentage
of public company acquisitions involve negative returns for bidder
shareholders. Recent research shows that compulsory shareholder voting
reduces the problem of bidder overpayment. Despite this evidence, the
response in corporate law has been muted. This article reviews the
empirical and legal literature on the role of bidder shareholders in
acquisitions and suggests ways that compulsory voting can be implemented
in large public company acquisitions to reduce the overpayment problem.
The popular press is replete with stories of bidder overpayment and
poorly performing corporate acquisitions. The disastrous combination of
firms such as America Online and Time Warner 1 or the problem-laden
* Afra Afsharipour, Professor of Law & Martin Luther King, Jr. Hall Research
Scholar, UC Davis School of Law. This symposium article was developed for the Oklahoma
Law Review Symposium, “Confronting New Market Realities: Implications for Stockholder
Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue.” I am thankful to the Oklahoma Law Review and Professor
Megan Shaner for inviting me to participate in this symposium. I am also grateful to Jill
Fisch, Diego Valderrama, and the participants of the symposium for their valuable insights
and comments. Khushi Desai provided outstanding research assistance. I appreciate the
institutional support of UC Davis School of Law, particularly Dean Kevin Johnson and
Associate Dean Madhavi Sunder.
1. See ROBERT F. BRUNER, DEALS FROM HELL: M&A LESSONS THAT RISE ABOVE THE
ASHES 265–91 (2005) (providing a detailed description of the AOL-Time Warner transaction
as “possibly the most notorious” deal from hell); Tim Arango, How the AOL-Time Warner
Merger Went So Wrong, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/11/
business/media/11merger.html (reporting that the 2000 deal valued the combined firm at
$350 billion, and that ten years later the combined value of the companies, which have since
separated, was about one-seventh of their combined value on the day of the merger); Steven
Davidoff Solomon, A Slow Demise for a Deal from Hell, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 29,
2009, 11:21 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/04/29/spins-splits-and-time-warnersdeal-from-hell/ (“That the AOL-Time Warner deal was one of the worst, if not the worst, in
history, is a sad truism for the markets and mergers and acquisitions classrooms
everywhere.”).
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acquisition of Countrywide by Bank of America 2 are often touted as
examples of acquisitions that proved to be terrible deals for the acquirer. A
company engrossed in an acquisition frenzy can end up overpaying for its
target by significant amounts. For example, in September 2011, Hewlett
Packard (“HP”), a venerated Silicon Valley firm, agreed to buy British
company Autonomy for $10.3 billion—a decision that was controversial
with HP shareholders who claimed that HP was overpaying for Autonomy. 3
Only a year later, HP announced a write-down of $8.8 billion related to the
Autonomy acquisition with over $5 billion due to accounting irregularities
at Autonomy. 4 Not only did HP fail to realize the gains it expected from the
Autonomy acquisition, but the transaction led to various lawsuits between
HP and Autonomy management, and resulted in a large securities class
action suit against HP. 5 The Autonomy deal was just one in a string of
questionable acquisitions by HP during a busy acquisition spree. 6
“[A] bad deal—whether the failure is rooted in the concept [i.e., the
‘logic of the deal,’ that is, the business justification for the proposed
acquisition], the price, or the execution—is probably the fastest legal means
of destroying [the company’s] value.” 7 A bad acquisition can result not
only in a lower share price, but also loss of jobs as the acquirer suffers in
the aftermath of a failed integration and the potential acquisition of massive
problems that may not have been adequately addressed at the target entity.
For example, Bank of America’s string of questionable empire-building
acquisitions, including the $4 billion acquisition of Countrywide, saddled
the firm with significant problems, including an estimated $40 billion in
mortgage-related losses, legal expenses, and settlements. 8 In the years
2. See Strife of Brian, ECONOMIST (Sept. 17, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/
21529060 (recounting the troubles that were brought on Bank of America as a result of a
string of questionable empire-building acquisitions, including the $4 billion acquisition of
Countrywide that saddled the bank with an estimated $30 billion in mortgage-related losses).
3. See Richard Waters & Peter Campbell, HP Enterprise Seeks to End Autonomy Saga
with Software Sale, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/e657857a-711311e6-a0c9-1365ce54b926.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See Clive Longbottom, HP: Where Next for the Troubled Silicon Valley Giant,
COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM (Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.computerweekly.com/feature/HPWhere-next-for-the-troubled-Silicon-Valley-giant.
7. Ken Smith, The M&A Buck Stops at the Board: Directors Are Learning Fast How to
Screen Out No-Win Deals, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: DEALMAKER’S J., Apr. 1, 2006, at 48,
49, 2006 WLNR 5570070.
8. See Ben Protess, Tallying the Costs of Bank of America’s Countrywide Nightmare,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Oct. 25, 2012, 5:19 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/10/25/
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following the acquisitions, Bank of America ended up selling some of the
businesses that it acquired and laying off tens of thousands of employees. 9
Empirical evidence backs up the story of disastrous acquisition
decisions. Studies have found that, in general, many large-scale acquisitions
of public companies by other public companies result in significant losses
for shareholders of acquiring firms. 10 Not only do bidder shareholders lose,
but the losses from the worst-performing deals can be staggering. For
example, a study of deals from 1998 to 2001 finds that bidder shareholders
lost 12% for every dollar spent on acquisitions, for a total of $240 billion. 11
Moreover, the study suggests that this is wealth destruction on an aggregate
scale and not just a wealth transfer to target shareholders from bidder
shareholders. 12
Studies suggest two non-mutually exclusive explanations for the
overpayment problem: agency problems and behavioral biases.
Acquisitions tend to highlight conflicts of interest between managers and
shareholders in large public corporations. 13 The acquirer’s management can
benefit significantly from acquisitions through increased power, prestige,
and additional compensation. 14 Acquisitions can also be significantly
tallying-the-costs-of-bank-of-americas-countrywide-nightmare/; Jessica Silver-Greenberg &
Susanne Craig, Bank of America Settles Suit over Merrill for $2.43 Billion, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Sept. 28, 2012, 8:49 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/09/28/bank-ofamerica-to-pay-2-43-billion-to-settle-class-action-over-merrill-deal/.
9. See E. Scott Reckard, BofA Targets Highly Paid Investment Bankers in Latest
Layoffs, L.A. TIMES (May 2, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/may/02/business/la-fi0502-bank-america-layoffs-20120502; Deon Roberts, Bank of America Head Count Almost
Down to 2008 Levels, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Mar. 6, 2016), http://www.charlotteobserver.
com/news/business/banking/article64138397.html.
10. See, e.g., Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO
Overconfidence and the Market’s Reaction, 89 J. FIN. ECON. 20, 34, 42 (2008).
11. Sara B. Moeller et al., Wealth Destruction on a Massive Scale? A Study of
Acquiring-Firm Returns in the Recent Merger Wave, 60 J. FIN. 757, 757 (2005) [hereinafter
Moeller et al., Wealth Destruction].
12. See id. at 758-59.
13. Beginning with Berle and Means’ seminal work, agency cost problems have long
dominated debates in U.S. corporate law about the conflicts between shareholders and
managers. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 4–5, 119–25 (1932); Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash
Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323, 328 (1986);
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
14. See Leonce Bargeron et al., Why Do Private Acquirers Pay So Little Compared to
Public Acquirers?, 89 J. FIN. ECON. 375, 376 (2008). For more on “empire building,” see
Christopher Avery et al., Why Do Managers Undertake Acquisitions? An Analysis of
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affected by various behavioral biases such as management overconfidence
about the value of the deal (i.e. the “hubris hypothesis”) or management
overestimation and overoptimism regarding its ability to execute the deal
successfully. 15
Neither the right to sell nor the right to sue effectively addresses the
bidder overpayment problem and the underlying factors contributing to it.
Selling serves as a weak monitoring mechanism for bidder stockholders
who often can only sell their shares after the share price has fallen
following announcement of an acquisition transaction.16 Even the specter of
a share drop following an acquisition announcement does little to deter
bidder management given weaknesses in the market for corporate control. 17
Suing is similarly unattractive for bidder shareholders. “Suing generally has
very large transaction costs: legal fees are high, acquiring information (for
example, discovery) is costly, and the judicial system moves slowly.” 18
More important with respect to bidder shareholders, the barriers to a
successful suit are quite high given that fiduciary duty cases by bidder
shareholders will generally be subject to business judgment review. 19
Moreover, the types of soft conflicts tied to overpayment, as identified by
the finance literature, are not the clear conflicts that often receive the
attention of plaintiffs’ lawyers and thus the courts.
Is it time to reassess the right to vote? Shareholder voting has long been
viewed as a way of “reducing managerial agency costs and maintaining
director accountability.” 20 As the Delaware court famously noted in
Internal and External Rewards for Acquisitiveness, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24, 24–28, 42
(1998); Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597, 627–28
(1989); John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical
Assessment of the Tender Offer’s Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145,
1167–69, 1224–29, 1269–80 (1984) [hereinafter Coffee, Regulating]; John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 29
(1986).
15. See Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. BUS. 197,
212 (1986); see also RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES AND
ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 50–62 (1992); Black, supra note 14, at 601–05, 624; Mark L.
Sirower & Mark Golovcsenko, Returns from the Merger Boom, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS:
DEALMAKER’S J., Mar. 1, 2004, at 34, 2004 WLNR 18181954; Richard H. Thaler,
Anomalies: The Winner’s Curse, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 191, 193–201 (1988).
16. See Paul H. Edelman et al., Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary
Capitalism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359, 1367 (2014).
17. See id.
18. Id. at 1375.
19. See id. at 1375 & n.4.
20. Jill E. Fisch, Standing Voting Instructions: Empowering the Excluded Retail
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Blasius, “[t]he shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon
which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.” 21 Nevertheless, as
discussed in Part II, in the U.S., management can easily avoid the
shareholder vote for bidder shareholders in acquisition transactions. The
fact that acquirers have the flexibility to structure their transactions to avoid
the shareholder vote also makes it challenging to empirically study the
effect of bidder shareholder votes on acquisitions in the U.S. Recent
studies, however, have attempted to address the value of bidder shareholder
voting in the U.S. 22 In addition, an important, recent study has addressed
the value of voting on acquisitions, looking at the U.K. market where
shareholder voting on large acquisitions is mandatory and binding under the
U.K. listing rules. 23 As discussed in Part III below, the study of acquisitions
made by U.K. companies between 1992 and 2010 shows that mandatory
acquirer shareholder voting increases firm value with results indicating that
with mandatory voting U.K. shareholders gained $13.6 billion over 1992–
2010 in aggregate (+$41 million on average), while without voting, U.K.
shareholders lost $3 billion in aggregate. Moreover, the results of the study
suggest that mandatory voting, which cannot be avoided by acquirer CEOs
in the U.K. as it can be in the U.S., changes the incentive of acquirers and
“imposes a constraint on the price that CEOs and boards can offer” in
transactions subject to mandatory voting. 24
There are several ways to achieve voting rights for bidder shareholders,
including private ordering through changes in the corporate contract, or
changes in stock exchange rules akin to the requirements imposed by the
listing rules in the U.K. Of course, such corporate governance proposals
may take years to have an actual impact, and there may be political and
economic reasons for stock exchanges to resist great shareholder voting
rights. Nevertheless, given fundamental changes in the shareholder base of
U.S. firms, voting in significant acquisitions may be more palatable now
than ever.
This article proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes the bidder
overpayment problem and the empirical explanations for overpayment:
agency problems and behavioral biases. Part II explains common
Investor, MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 4-5), https://ssrn.com/abstract
=2972838 [hereinafter Fisch, Standing Voting Instructions].
21. Blasius, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).
22. See infra Section III.A.
23. Marco Becht et al., Does Mandatory Shareholder Voting Prevent Bad Acquisitions?,
29 REV. FIN. STUD. 3035, 3037 (2016).
24. Id. at 3064.
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acquisition deal structuring and how such structuring limits or eliminates
the voting rights of bidder shareholders. Part II then provides a brief
overview of why the shareholders’ rights to sell or sue do not provide
sufficient protection to bidder shareholders nor are useful checks on the
reasons for bidder overpayment. Part III describes the empirical literature
on voting and bidder overpayment, including recent literature that strongly
suggests that mandatory voting imposes constraints on bidder management
and can serve as a deterrent to large, value-destroying acquisitions. Part III
then examines the arguments for shareholder voting in public company
acquisitions and ways to achieve voting rights. Part IV concludes.
I. The Bidder Overpayment Problem and Its Roots
Empirical studies commonly find that acquisition transactions,
particularly significant transactions involving publicly traded targets and
buyers, result in losses for bidder firms and their shareholders. Section A
below briefly summarizes the overpayment literature. Sections B examines
the two leading explanations for bidder overpayment. Studies have
generally attributed overpayment to managerial agency costs (such as
personal benefits in the form of increased compensation for management)
and behavioral biases (such as ego and hubris) of bidder management.
A. The Bidder Overpayment Problem
Finance scholars have noted that “[e]xtensive empirical evidence shows
that a large percentage of transactions involve negative returns for acquirer
shareholders and that the losses from the worst performing deals are very
large.” 25 Initially, the examination of whether bidder shareholders win or
lose in acquisitions was mixed. 26 Some early studies on the wealth effects
of acquisitions suggest that bidder shareholders benefit or remain neutral
from acquisitions, while other studies report losses. 27 A significant body of
more recent empirical studies find, however, evidence that many, although

25. Id. at 3036.
26. For an overview of the early literature on bidder performance in M&A transactions,
see generally Afra Afsharipour, A Shareholders’ Put Option: Counteracting the Acquirer
Overpayment Problem, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1018 (2012) [hereinafter Afsharipour,
Shareholders’ Put Option].
27. See generally Robert F. Bruner, Does M&A Pay? A Survey of Evidence for the
Decision-Maker, 12 J. APPLIED FIN. 48 (2002) (surveying over 100 studies published from
1971 to 2001 on the results to shareholders of M&A transactions and finding that bidder
shareholders essentially break even).
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clearly not all, acquisitions destroy value for long-term bidder
shareholders. 28
Bidder overpayment is particularly acute in the case of takeovers of
publicly traded targets by publicly traded acquirers. 29 A survey of the
empirical literature on takeovers of U.S. targets from 1980 to 2005 finds
that announcement-period cumulative average abnormal stock returns for
bidder shareholders are close to zero for the overall sample of studies, with
49% of bidders having negative cumulative abnormal stock returns.30 For
bidder shareholders, acquisitions of large public targets by public company
bidders represent a “worst-case scenario” with average acquirer
announcement-period cumulative abnormal returns of a significant loss of
2.21%. 31

28. See Gregor Andrade et al., New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers, 15 J. ECON.
PERSP. 103, 110–11 (2001); Christa H. S. Bouwman et al., Market Valuation and Acquisition
Quality: Empirical Evidence, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 633, 636 (2009); Jarrad Harford et al., The
Sources of Value Destruction in Acquisitions by Entrenched Managers, 106 J. FIN. ECON.
247, 247–48, 260 (2012); Tim Loughran & Anand M. Vijh, Do Long-Term Shareholders
Benefit from Corporate Acquisitions?, 52 J. FIN. 1765, 1773–89 (1997); Sara B. Moeller et
al., Firm Size and the Gains from Acquisitions, 73 J. FIN. ECON. 201, 202, 226 (2004)
[hereinafter Moeller et al., Firm Size]; Moeller et al., Wealth Destruction, supra note 11, at
781; Gunther Tichy, What Do We Know About Success and Failure of Mergers?, 1 J.
INDUSTRY COMPETITION & TRADE 347, 366–68 (2001). Some scholars argue that acquisition
activity is driven by overvalued stock and that acquisitions by acquirers with overvalued
stock can benefit the acquirer’s shareholders in the long run, as long as the target firm’s
stock is less overvalued. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Stock Market Driven
Acquisitions, 70 J. FIN. ECON. 295, 301–02 (2003). Other scholars challenge this proposition,
finding that “overvalued acquirers often significantly overpay for the targets they purchase”
and that such “acquisitions do not produce the necessary synergy gains.” Fangjian Fu et al.,
Acquisitions Driven by Stock Overvaluation: Are They Good Deals?, 109 J. FIN. ECON. 24,
25 (2013). Moreover, Fu et al. also find that “[o]vervalued acquirers incur significantly
worse stock returns during the five years following acquisitions than the control firms that
did not engage in mergers” and also experience “significant deterioration in operating
performance”. Id. at 26.
29. See Harford et al., supra note 28, at 247–48. Studies suggest that private acquirers
experience better post-acquisition performance than public acquirers because of lower
agency problems. Andrey Golubov & Nan Xiong, Why Do Private Acquirers Outperform
Public Acquirers? 26–27 (European Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper Series in Fin.,
Paper No. 482/2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834805.
30. Sandra Betton et al., Corporate Takeovers, in 2 HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE
FINANCE: EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 291, 407 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2008).
31. Id. There is some evidence that indicates that certain acquirers, companies such as
Cisco and Berkshire Hathaway, tend to be very good at acquisitions and the performance of
the best acquirers persists from deal to deal, while bad acquirers continue to perform poorly.
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Empirical evidence suggests that the losses suffered by bidder
shareholders in the largest and worst-performing deals are very
significant. 32 The studies by Moeller et al. indicate that managers of large
firms pay more for acquisitions, and that premiums paid to targets are larger
when the acquirer is larger.33 Other studies find that “the relative size of the
target to the acquirer is more important for acquirer shareholder value” and
that acquirer shareholders returns are better when the bidder purchases a
small firm versus when it attempts “mergers of equals or transformational
M&A deals.” 34
B. What Explains Bidder Overpayment? Agency Costs & Behavioral Biases
Studies identify two non-exclusive explanations for the bidder
overpayment problem: agency problems and behavioral biases.
1. Agency Costs
Both legal and finance scholars have pointed to agency costs in
explaining bidder overpayment. 35 Acquisitions highlight divergent
shareholder-manager incentives and provide an opportunity for managers to
obtain personal gain at the expense of shareholders. Michael Jensen’s free
cash flow hypothesis, for example, theorized that equity overvaluation
allows “managers [to] realize large personal gains from empire building and
predict[ed] that firms with abundant cash flows but few profitable
investment opportunities are more likely to make value-destroying
acquisitions than to return the excess cash flows to shareholders.”36 Several
studies support Jensen’s theory and provide evidence that the acquirer’s
management can benefit significantly from acquisitions through increased
power, prestige, and additional compensation.37
See generally Andrey Golubov et al., Extraordinary Acquirers, 116 J. FIN. ECON. 314
(2015).
32. See Moeller et al., Firm Size, supra note 28, at 202, 226; Moeller et al., Wealth
Destruction, supra note 11, at 781.
33. See Moeller et al., Firm Size, supra note 28, at 202, 226.
34. Eliezer M. Fich et al., Large Wealth Creation in Mergers and Acquisitions 2–3
(Aug. 8, 2016) (AFA 2013 San Diego Meetings Paper), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2020507
or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2020507.
35. See, e.g., Black, supra note 14, at 627-28; Coffee, Regulating, supra note 14, at
1167–69, 1224–29; Jensen, supra note 13, at 323; Ronald W. Masulis et al., Corporate
Governance and Acquirer Returns, 62 J. FIN. 1851, 1852 (2007).
36. Masulis et al., supra note 35, at 1852 (citing Jensen, supra note 13).
37. See Bargeron et al., supra note 14, at 376; Yaniv Grinstein & Paul Hribar, CEO
Compensation and Incentives: Evidence from M&A Bonuses, 73 J. FIN. ECON. 119, 121
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Several studies point to CEO compensation as the motive behind
acquisitions, particularly those that lead to overpayment. For example, a
study by Jarrad Harford and Kai Li finds that CEOs benefit personally from
making acquisitions even when such acquisitions have poor outcomes for
shareholders. 38 These acquisitions may provide the board and the CEO a
“natural opportunity” to increase the CEO’s compensation since the
increase in firm size and operations allows “the CEO to argue for more pay
and for pay that is less sensitive to performance for the first few years of the
acquisition.” 39 Others have similarly argued that CEO compensation, rather
than shareholder value creation, is likely the primary reason for
acquisitions, even for overvalued acquirers.40 For example, Fu et al. find
that “acquirer CEOs in overvaluation-driven acquisitions obtain substantial
pecuniary benefits following these transactions, specifically large, new
restricted stock and option grants.”41 The study also finds that the increases
in CEO compensation “often outweigh the relatively small decreases in the
value of the CEO’s equity holding in the acquiring firm.” 42
From a corporate governance perspective, studies indicate that
acquisitions made by entrenched management destroy the most value for
bidder shareholders. 43 Studies suggest that in firms with significant
takeover defenses, managers can “make unprofitable acquisitions without
facing a serious threat of losing corporate control.”44 Moreover, in firms
with overvalued stock, studies have found that acquiring firms with “weak
governance structures prior to their acquisition attempts” tend to
significantly overpay for the companies they buy and that such acquisitions
do not produce the intended synergy gains. 45 Researchers have identified

(2004) (showing that CEOs who have more power to influence board decisions receive
significantly larger M&A bonuses, but these bonuses are not related to deal performance);
see also Jarrad Harford & Kai Li, Decoupling CEO Wealth and Firm Performance: The
Case of Acquiring CEOs, 62 J. FIN. 917, 919 (2007). For more on “empire building,” see
sources cited supra note 14.
38. See Harford & Li, supra note 37, at 919; see also Richard T. Bliss & Richard J.
Rosen, CEO Compensation and Bank Merger, 61 J. FIN. ECON. 107, 108 (2001) (finding that
CEO compensation in bank mergers increases even if the merger causes the acquirer’s stock
price to decline).
39. Harford & Li, supra note 37, at 918.
40. See Fu et al., supra note 28, at 25–26.
41. Id. at 26.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Masulis et al., supra note 35, at 1853.
44. Id. at 1854.
45. Fu et al., supra note 28, at 26.
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several factors for value destruction by entrenched management. Per two
recent studies, entrenched bidder management (1) disproportionately avoids
private targets, which have been shown to be associated with valuecreation; 46 (2) tends to not pay with stock when buying a private company
target, thus avoiding the governance benefits that would otherwise accrue
from creating a blockholder in the bidder; and (3) tends to both overpay and
acquire low-synergy targets. 47
2. Behavioral Biases
Behavioral biases may play an important role in corporate transactions.48
Acquisitions, in particular, can be affected by management overconfidence
about the value of the deal (i.e. the “hubris hypothesis”), management’s
overestimation of and overoptimism regarding its ability to execute the deal
successfully, and management’s desire to win or sunk cost biases.49
Several studies have empirically tested the role of management biases in
acquisition decisions. In Mathew L.A. Hayward and Donald C. Hambrick’s
examination of 106 large acquisitions, they find “losses in acquiring firms’
shareholder wealth following an acquisition, and the greater the CEO hubris
46. See Micah S. Officer, The Price of Corporate Liquidity: Acquisition Discounts for
Unlisted Targets, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 571 (2007).
47. See Harford et al., supra note 28, at 247.
48. See generally James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom:
Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (1984); Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith and
Structural Bias, 32 J. CORP. L. 833 (2007); Donald C. Langevoort, Ego, Human Behavior,
and Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 853 (1995); Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of
the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135
(2002); Donald C. Langevoort, The Behavioral Economics of Mergers and Acquisitions, 12
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 65 (2011) [hereinafter Langevoort, The Behavioral]; Lynn
A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J.
CORP. L. 635 (2003).
49. See James A. Fanto, Quasi-Rationality in Action: A Study of Psychological Factors
in Merger Decision-Making, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1333, 1354–81 (2001); sources cited supra
note 15; see also, e.g., Vicki Bogan & David Just, What Drives Merger Decision Making
Behavior? Don’t Seek, Don’t Find, and Don’t Change Your Mind, 72 J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 930, 932 (2009) (noting that confirmation bias, “a situation in which an individual
attaches too much importance to information that supports his views,” impacts merger
decisions); Deepak Malhotra, The Desire to Win: The Effects of Competitive Arousal on
Motivation and Behavior, 111 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 139, 139 (2010)
(examining “when and why potentially self-damaging competitive motivations and
behaviors will emerge”); Deepak Malhotra et al., When Winning Is Everything, HARV. BUS.
REV., May 2008, at 78, 80 (identifying “three principal drivers of competitive arousal in
business settings: rivalry, time pressure, and audience scrutiny”).
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and acquisition premiums, the greater the shareholder losses” following an
acquisition. 50 Moreover, Hayward and Hambrick’s study also indicates that
the relationship between acquisition premiums and CEO hubris is stronger
in cases where the board has a high proportion of inside directors and a
CEO who also serves as chair of the board. 51 Ulrike Malmendier and
Geoffrey Tate’s study of the role of CEO overconfidence similarly suggests
that overconfident CEOs tend to overpay. 52 The study finds “that the odds
of making an acquisition are 65% higher if the CEO is classified as
overconfident,” and that “[t]he effect is largest if the merger is diversifying
and does not require external financing.” 53 The study suggests that the
market reaction for merger announcements by an overconfident CEO is
significantly more negative than for announcements by non-overconfident
CEOs. 54
Behavioral biases may be amplified by advisors, including investment
bankers, consultants who have been hired to undertake significant
integration efforts, and even lawyers advising acquirers. 55 Investment
bankers, for example, are commonly conflicted in M&A transactions.56
Bidders often use bankers to provide valuation assistance and fairness
opinions in acquiring targets, but the vast bulk of an advisor’s
compensation for this work depends on completion of the transaction.57 In
50. Mathew L. A. Hayward & Donald C. Hambrick, Explaining the Premiums Paid for
Large Acquisitions: Evidence of CEO Hubris, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q., 103, 103 (1997). Hayward
and Hambrick identify four indicators of CEO hubris as relevant to the acquisition premium,
“the acquiring company’s recent performance, recent media praise for the CEO, a measure
of the CEO’s self-importance, and a composite factor of these three variables.” Id.; see also
Arijit Chatterjee & Donald C. Hambrick, It’s All About Me: Narcissistic Chief Executive
Officers and Their Effects on Company Strategy and Performance, 52 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 351,
351–52 (2007) (arguing that narcissistic CEOs favor strategic dynamism and grandiosity,
and tend to deliver extreme and volatile performance for their organizations).
51. See Hayward & Hambrick, supra note 50, at 117–18.
52. See Malmendier & Tate, supra note 10, at 20; see also Ulrike Malmendier &
Geoffrey Tate, CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment, 60 J. FIN. 2661, 2661
(2005) (“Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects and
view external funds as unduly costly.”).
53. Malmendier & Tate, supra note 10, at 20.
54. Id.
55. Krishnan and Masulis find that top bidder law firms are “associated with
significantly higher takeover premia." C. N. V. Krishnan & Ronald W. Masulis, Law Firm
Expertise and Merger and Acquisition Outcomes, 56 J.L. & ECON. 189, 189 (2013).
56. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, When a Bank Works Both Sides, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/08/business/yourmoney/08deal.html.
57. See Steven M. Davidoff, Fairness Opinions, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1557, 1586–87
(2006).
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cases where management stands to benefit from doing a deal, the often
“close relationship” between company management and financial advisors
can induce advisors to recommend transactions in order to “avoid
displeasing management.” 58
Anecdotal evidence suggests that despite CEO biases, often the board
does not effectively stand in management’s way in large acquisitions. Once
management and its advisors begin to feel committed to a deal and have
expended significant resources to move forward on a transaction,
abandoning plans can be quite difficult. For example, HP’s then-board chair
allegedly attempted to raise concerns about the Autonomy acquisition, but
then-CEO Leo Apotheker was reluctant to back away, and the board did not
press any further. 59 The reluctance to abandon an acquisition can be strong
even in the face of significant shareholder opposition. As discussed in Part
II below, there are many ways in the U.S. for acquirers to avoid or take
away the ability of bidder shareholders to express their opposition to an
acquisition. 60
II. The Rights of Bidder Shareholders in Acquisitions:
Selling, Suing, and Voting
Two structures—a one-step triangular merger, or a two-step transaction
involving a tender offer followed by a merger—are often used to acquire
publicly traded firms in the U.S. 61 Under both structures, target
shareholders are commonly provided a say, either through a vote or through
the decision to sell their shares. In addition, target shareholders can seek
access to courts to address any harm they have suffered. U.S. law, however,
does little to address harm to bidder shareholders. Transactions can be
58. Tamar Frankel, The Influence of Investment Banks on Corporate Governance, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 352, 357–58 (Claire A. Hill
& Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012); see also Davidoff, supra note 57, at 1587.
59. See Barb Darrow, HP’s Ray Lane Tried to Kill Autonomy Deal, Documents Show,
FORTUNE (Sept. 26, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/09/26/hps-ray-lane-tried-to-killautonomy-deal/.
60. See Stephen Bainbridge, How and Why Kraft Is Evading Shareholder Voting in the
Cadbury Deal, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Jan. 21, 2010, 11:27 AM), http://
www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2010/01/evading-shareholder-votingin-a-merger.html; Steven Davidoff Solomon, Warren Buffett’s Lost Vote, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Jan. 21, 2010, 9:05 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/warrenbuffetts-lost-vote/.
61. See John C. Coates, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Restructuring: Types, Regulation,
and Patterns of Practice 4-5 (Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 781,
2014), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Coates_781.pdf.
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structured so that under state corporate law or stock exchange listing rules,
bidder shareholders are excluded from any decision-making role in
acquisitions. 62 Moreover, bidder shareholders cannot meaningfully seek any
redress through the courts.
This section begins by recounting the limited voting rights that bidder
shareholders have in acquisition transactions. It then provides a brief
overview of why neither the shareholders’ rights to sell or sue provide
sufficient protection to bidder shareholders nor are useful checks on the
factors that contribute to bidder overpayment.
A. Bidder Shareholder Voting Rights
Public company acquirers commonly use two types of transactional
structures to purchase other public companies—triangular mergers and
tender offers. 63 As explained below, under both structures, bidder
shareholders are often deprived of voting rights.
1. Triangular Mergers
Over the past several decades, the triangular merger structure has
emerged as one of the most popular acquisition structures. The triangular
merger is a popular method for acquiring a firm for many reasons,
including survivor liability issues because the bidder can acquire the target
as a separate entity without having to incorporate it into the bidder
corporation itself. Moreover, triangular acquisitions also have benefits
related to preservation of the licenses and contracts of the target and
potential tax benefits.64
One of the most important considerations for public companies,
particularly for those incorporated in Delaware, is using the triangular
structure to deprive bidder shareholders of voting and appraisal rights. 65
62. For a detailed discussion of this structuring, see generally Afra Afsharipour, Deal
Structure and Minority Shareholders, in COMPARATIVE TAKEOVER REGULATION: GLOBAL
AND ASIAN PERSPECTIVES (Umakanth Varottil & Wan Wai Yee, eds.) (forthcoming 2017)
[hereinafter Afsharipour, Deal Structure].
63. See Coates, supra note 61, at 4–5.
64. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 56–57 (3d ed. 2012);
THERESE H. MAYNARD, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS
105–07 (3d ed. 2013).
65. Kimble C. Cannon and Patrick J. Tangney, Protection of Minority Shareholder
Rights Under Delaware Law: Reinforcing Shareholders as Residual Claimants and
Maximizing Long-Term Share Value by Restricting Directorial Discretion, 1995 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 725, 762. The triangular merger also has several other benefits related to
successor liability, tax and accounting issues.
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Under Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) section 251(c), only
shareholders of a “constituent” corporation are entitled to vote on the
transaction, and under section 262(b)(2), appraisal rights are similarly
available only to voting shareholders of a “constituent” corporation to the
merger. 66 In a triangular structure, however, the actual bidder is not one of
the “constituent” corporations; instead, it is the bidder’s shell subsidiary
that merges with the target company. 67
The ability of public company bidders to avoid a vote is somewhat
limited in transactions where the acquisition structure involves the bidder’s
stock. If the bidder needs to amend its charter to authorize the additional
stock being issued in the transaction, bidder shareholders will in essence be
voting on the acquisition since “shareholders will be voting on the
amendment [with] full knowledge that the amendment is necessary to effect
the deal as structured.” 68 Stock exchange rules may also require the bidders
to solicit a vote of bidder shareholders if the bidder will be issuing stock
amounting to more than 20% of its outstanding shares. 69 Bidders can,
66. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251(c), 262(b)(2) (West 2016). Appraisal rights allow
shareholders to refuse to accept the consideration offered in a deal and instead turn to the
courts to determine the “fair value” of their shares. Until recently, appraisal was viewed as a
limited remedy because of significant costs and delays connected with the exercise of
appraisal rights, and the uncertainties of the valuation process. For an overview of the
appraisal process and debates about its value, see Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers,
Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1551,
1558–66 (2015). More recently, appraisal actions have gained some steam due to certain
sophisticated investors, particularly hedge funds, acting as dissenting shareholders. See
Korsmo & Myers, supra, at 1568. The rise in appraisal litigation has been rife with
controversy and efforts to limit appraisal cases. See e.g. Craig Boyd, Appraisal Arbitrage:
Closing the Floodgates on Hedge Funds and Activist Shareholders, 65 KAN. L. REV. 497,
522 (2016). Several scholars, however, cautioned against closing the door to appraisal,
arguing that appraisal cases play an important corporate governance role and may have
significantly more value than other types of shareholder litigation. See generally Charles
Korsmo & Minor Myers, The Structure of Stockholder Litigation: When Do the Merits
Matter?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 829 (2014); Wei Jiang, Tao Li, Danqing Mei & Randall S.
Thomas, Appraisal: Shareholder Remedy or Litigation Arbitrage?, 59 J. LAW & ECON. 697
(2016); Steven Davidoff Solomon, Delaware Effort to Protect Shareholders May End Up
TIMES
DEALBOOK
(May
24,
2016),
Hurting
Them,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/25/business/dealbook/delaware-effort-to-protectshareholders-may-end-up-hurting-them.html?_r=0.
67. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 64, at 56.
68. Bainbridge, supra note 60.
69. See NASDAQ, NASDAQ STOCK MARKET RULES r. 5635(a)(1)(B) (amended 2009),
http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/ (follow “Rule 5000” hyperlink; then follow “5600.
Corporate Governance Requirements” hyperlink; then scroll down to Rule 5635); NYSE,
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however, structure their transactions to include a combination of cash and
stock where the stock component constitutes no more than 19.9% of issued
and outstanding bidder shares. 70
But even if bidder shareholders do get a vote based on charter
amendment or stock exchange rules, they would not receive appraisal rights
under state corporate law.
2. Tender Offers
Tender offers are the other common acquisition structure used by public
company acquirers.
The Williams Act, which is codified in sections 13(d) and 14(d)(1) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”), regulates tender
offers. 71 Much of the focus of the Williams Act is on protecting the target
company shareholders. 72 While shareholders of the target have layers of
protection encompassed within the Exchange Act rules in tender offer
transactions, bidder shareholders in general have little protection under
federal or state corporate law. The Williams Act does not squarely address
the rights of bidder shareholders.
Similarly, state corporate law often excludes a role for bidder
shareholders in tender offers. Delaware law does not include a statutory
requirement for bidder shareholders to have a vote in a tender offer
transaction. 73 Thus, unless the acquirer does not have enough authorized
LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 312.03(c)–(d) (amended 2015), http://nysemanual.nyse.
com/lcm/ (follow “Section 303A.00” hyperlink). The voting requirements under both the
NYSE and NASDAQ rules do not require a vote of a majority of the outstanding shares. See
NASDAQ STOCK MARKET RULES r. 5635(e) (requiring a majority of votes cast on a
particular proposal); id. r. 5620(c) (requiring at least one-third of all voting shares to be
present for purposes of a quorum); NYSE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 312.07 (amended
2013) (requiring a majority of the voting shares for approval, so long as over 50% of the
voting shares participate in the vote).
70. See Afsharipour, Shareholders’ Put Option, supra note 26, at 1046–47.
71. For an overview of the history of the Williams Act, see generally Christina M.
Sautter, Tender Offers and Disclosure: The History and Future of the Williams Act, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 352 (Claire A. Hill & Steven
Davidoff Solomon eds., 2016).
72. See Afsharipour, Deal Structure, supra note 62, at 9.
73. See Joel Edan Friedlander, Overturn Time-Warner Three Different Ways, 33 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 631, 641–43 (2008). Some jurisdictions, most notably California, provide bidder
shareholders a vote in tender offers where the consideration consists of the stock of the
acquirer’s shareholders. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1201.5 (West 1990). Like the voting rules
in other types of acquisition transactions, the exception under section 1201.5(b) of the
California Corporations Code provides that approval is not needed by the shareholders of an
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and unissued shares in a stock-for-stock tender offer, bidder shareholders
have no voting rights under state corporate law. 74 Moreover, if the bidder is
using cash or less than 20% of its outstanding stock as the acquisition
currency, then the stock exchange rules necessitating a shareholder vote
would not apply.
B. Shareholders’ Rights to Sell or Sue
Shareholder rights are not limited to voting rights. Shareholders unhappy
with corporate decisions may also sell their shares—in other words,
exercise their “wall street vote,” or attempt to bring litigation against the
board, in particular through fiduciary duty litigation. Yet, both the right to
sell and the right to sue have failed to temper bidder overpayment and its
underlying causes.
1. Why the Right to Sell May Not Sufficiently Counter Bidder
Overpayment
One of the key rights held by shareholders, particularly public company
shareholders, is the right to sell shares at will.75 Scholars have long hailed
the right to sell shares as particularly strong and important to shareholders
“because it is a means of obtaining economic benefit from their investment
in the corporation and because it is their means of exit should they become
dissatisfied with management.” 76 The right to sell has been described as
“robust” 77 and as a primary mechanism to address agency problems in
companies. 78 Henry Manne famously argued that a decrease in share price
as a result of discontented shareholders selling their shares would provide

entity which will own more than 83.3% (or five-sixths) of the voting power of the surviving
corporation immediately after the transaction. See id. § 1201.5(b).
74. See Friedlander, supra note 73, at 641–43.
75. See Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the
Shareholder Role: “Sacred Space” in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REV. 261, 304
(2001). There are some restrictions on the right to sell shares, such as federal securities laws
with respect to insider trading and limitations imposed via contract. See generally Julian
Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of Shareholders, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 415–16
(2006).
76. Velasco, supra note 75, at 425.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53
VA. L. REV. 259, 273 (1967). For an overview of the literature on the right to sell, see
generally James J. Park, The Limits of the Right to Sell and the Rise of Federal Corporate
Law, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 159 (2017).
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an opportunity to third parties to replace inefficient management. 79
According to Manne, “[t]he lower the stock price, relative to what it could
be with more efficient management, the more attractive the takeover
becomes to those who believe that they can manage the company more
efficiently.” 80
The right to sell, however, is not without limitation. In the context of
bidder overpayment, it is not clear that post-announcement sale of shares
has to date disciplined public company managers in their acquisition
decisions. Bidder shareholders do not usually have information about an
upcoming acquisition until the acquisition is announced, typically
immediately after the parties sign the acquisition agreement. The response
of shareholders to many large public company acquisitions has been to sell
their shares, resulting in the phenomenon that bidder share prices often
react negatively upon announcement of an acquisition of a public
company. 81 Nevertheless, once an acquisition agreement has been signed,
even if bidder shareholders react negatively to the announced deal, the
opportunity for the bidder to walk away is low. 82 In the case of a bad
acquisition decision, then, bidder shareholders are rarely able to protect
themselves from significant losses. Moreover, since bidder shareholders
often do not have voting rights in acquisition decisions, bidder management
is not particularly incentivized to gauge shareholder reaction to an
acquisition prior to an announcement.
In addition, the destruction of long-term value of the acquiring firm, as
demonstrated by firms such as HP, often arises long after managers have
left the firm. Even if the managers stick around, “[s]elling shares effectively
disciplines management only if the market for corporate control is
robust.” 83 The market for corporate control, however, has been substantially

79. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL.
ECON. 110, 112 (1965).
80. Id. at 113.
81. See Kathleen Fuller et al., What Do Returns to Acquiring Firms Tell Us? Evidence
from Firms That Make Many Acquisitions, 57 J. FIN. 1763, 1764 (2002).
82. See Afra Afsharipour, Transforming the Allocation of Deal Risk Through Reverse
Termination Fees, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1173–78 (2010). The ability of a buyer to walk
away from a transaction prior to closing is often subject to a material adverse change (MAC)
or material adverse effect in the seller’s business. Convincing a court that a MAC has
occurred in the seller’s business has proved to be difficult for buyers. MAYNARD, supra note
64, at 383-86.
83. Edelman et al., supra note 16, at 1366.
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eroded by directors’ ability to adopt significant defensive tactics, such as
poison pills. 84
2. Shortcomings in Fiduciary Duty Litigation
In addition to the right to sell, shareholders also hold the right to sue. In
acquisition transactions, particularly large public company deals, both the
boards of the bidder and target generally consider and vote on the
transaction. The boards’ involvement in these transactions, which for
targets is often statutorily mandated, can then expose the boards to potential
fiduciary duty claims from shareholders. The claims raised by shareholders
in fiduciary duty cases often involve issues surrounding the business
judgment rule, the duty of care, and the duty of loyalty (including good
faith). 85
Corporate law casebooks are replete with cases where shareholders of
the target company have brought fiduciary duty claims against the target’s
board. The Delaware courts’ case law on the fiduciary duties of target
boards is a mainstay of U.S. corporate law debates. 86 Fiduciary duty
litigation against target boards is often expected in large public company
acquisition transactions.87
84. See generally Christine Hurt, The Hostile Poison Pill, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137
(2016).
85. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder
Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 167 (2004). The
Delaware courts have opined that failure to act in good faith is in essence a failure of the
duty of loyalty. In other words, failing to act in good faith means that a Board has
intentionally failed “to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious
disregard for his duties.” Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del. 2009)
(quoting In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006)).
86. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180
(Del. 1986) (holding that in the event of a change or control or break-up of the company,
enhanced scrutiny applied); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del.
1985) (“Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own
interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders, there is an enhanced duty
which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of the business
judgment rule may be conferred.”); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711–15 (Del.
1983) (holding that in freeze-out mergers the requirements of entire fairness, including fair
dealing and fair price, applied). See generally J. Travis Laster, Revlon Is a Standard of
Review: Why It’s True and What It Means, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 5, 9–11, 53–54
(2013) (examining the Revlon standard and its progeny).
87. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 85, at 135, 137 (documenting the rise of
merger litigation between 1999 and 2000). The last decade witnessed a staggering increase
in merger litigation, as evidence by Cain and Davidoff Solomon’s comprehensive study of
1117 transactions from 2005 through 2011. See Matthew D. Caine & Stephen Davidoff
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Unlike the vast number of fiduciary duty cases against target boards,
fiduciary duty cases against bidder boards are rarely brought and even more
rarely successfully litigated. 88 Theoretically, bidder boards’ decisionmaking role in major acquisitions could make the boards vulnerable to
shareholder lawsuits. This theoretical possibility, however, is unlikely to
come to fruition. The study by Robert B. Thompson and Randall S.
Thomas, for example, shows that most fiduciary duty suits challenge
director actions in the sale of a company, rather than director actions with
respect to the decision to acquire a company. 89 Despite the vast increase in
M&A litigation, plaintiff lawyers do not often endeavor to bring fiduciary
duty suits against bidder boards given that the value of such suits is rather
low. Moreover, in the few cases that have been brought against bidder
boards, shareholders have not been successful. 90
The norm of deference to board decision-making plays a powerful role in
curtailing suits against bidder boards. No established body of case law
examines fiduciary duties of bidder boards. 91 In general, courts’ usual
response to a shareholder complaint 92 in an acquisition negotiated on an
arm’s-length basis is to apply the highly deferential business judgment
standard of review to the allegations of the complaint. 93 If the board’s
decision to acquire the target is merely careless or negligent, such a

Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L.
REV. 465, 475–77 (2015). The rise in merger litigation was substantially curtailed in 2015
due in large part to the Delaware Court of Chancery’s refusal to approve immaterial
disclosure-only settlements. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Takeover
Litigation in 2015 3 (Jan. 14, 2016) (unpublished report), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2715890.
88. See Afsharipour, Shareholders’ Put Option, supra note 26, at 1055–60.
89. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 85, at 167.
90. See, e.g., In re Dow Chem. Co. Derivative Litig., No. 4349-CC, 2010 WL 66769
(Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 2010); Ash v. McCall, No. 17132, 2000 WL 1370341 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15,
2000).
91. See Lawrence. A. Hamermesh, Premiums in Stock-For-Stock Mergers and Some
Consequences in the Law of Director Fiduciary Duties, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 881, 909 (2003).
92. Shareholders can bring fiduciary duty claims directly if they, rather than the
corporation, suffered the injury. Such direct claims tend to be limited to claims brought by
shareholders of target companies. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 85, at 167–68.
93. The business judgment rule is “a presumption that in making a business decision the
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief
that the action taken was in the best interests of the company. Absent an abuse of discretion,
that judgment will be respected by the courts.” Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.
1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
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decision does not amount to a duty of care violation.94 To be clear, in these
duty of care cases, shareholders’ only option is to attack the board’s
decision-making process rather than the actual business result. 95 Even if the
board violates its duty of care—that is, the board is grossly negligent in the
process it undertook to approve the deal—a damages claim against directors
for violations of the duty of care is unavailable because most companies’
charters include a statutory exculpation provision limiting such claims. 96
Duty of loyalty litigation is also not generally fruitful in arms-length
acquisitions. The types of agency costs identified in the bidder overpayment
literature tend to be soft conflicts that are hard to address through litigation
and the courts. 97 These soft conflicts differ from the classic duty of loyalty
cases—often involving controlling shareholders or management buyouts—
that arise in merger-related litigation. 98 Moreover, alleging bad faith by
bidder shareholder plaintiffs is even more difficult, as the courts have stated
that bad faith, in a transactional context, requires an “extreme set of
facts . . . premised on the notion that disinterested directors were
intentionally disregarding their duties.” 99
Despite these litigation challenges, some scholars have previously
advocated for greater judicial responses to the bidder overpayment
problem. 100 Others, concerned with the high costs of litigation, have warned
94. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (articulating that the
standard for determining a breach of the duty of care is gross negligence), overruled in part
on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
95. See E. Norman Veasey, Law and Fact in Judicial Review of Corporate
Transactions, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 11 (2002).
96. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2016).
97. Commentators often refer to the concept of soft conflicts, for example situations
where management may not be on both sides of a transaction in a way that clearly implicates
the duty of loyalty, but where management may for self-interested reasons steer a transaction
in a certain direction. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Documenting the Deal: How Quality
Control and Candor Can Improve Boardroom Decision-making and Reduce the Litigation
Target Zone, 70 BUS. LAW. 679 (2015).
98. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of
Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1786 (2004) (finding that after Delaware
adopted section 102(b)(7) allowing companies to opt out of liability for the duty of care, the
bulk of derivative suits brought in Delaware were duty of loyalty claims involving conflicted
director actions).
99. In re Dow Chem. Derivative Litig., No. 4349-CC, 2010 WL 66769, at *10 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 11, 2010) (quoting Lyondell Chem. Corp. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del. 2009)).
100. See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., Unprofitable Mergers: Toward a Market-Based
Legal Response, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 777, 784 (1986); James A. Fanto, Braking the Merger
Momentum: Reforming Corporate Law Governing Mega-Mergers, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 249,
341–44 (2001); Hamermesh, supra note 91, at 900–11.
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against litigation as a tool to address bidder overpayment. 101 Given the
dearth of buy-side shareholder litigation, it is unclear whether greater
judicial scrutiny of board decisions could address the agency costs or
behavioral biases contributing to bidder overpayment.
III. Reassessing Shareholder Voting in Acquisitions
Is it time to reexamine voting given the existing, relatively low voting
incidences and shortcomings with selling and suing?
Several prominent legal scholars have suggested shareholder voting
rights for bidder shareholders, but much of this debate has been muted over
the past ten years. In response to the contemporary empire-building
literature of the 1980s, Professor Coffee suggested the adoption of a rule
that would require a tender offer acquirer to obtain approval from the
acquirer’s own shareholders. 102 Professor Coffee explained that requiring
acquirer shareholder approval would discourage inefficient empire-building
and acquirer overpayment, while preserving the market for corporate
control. 103 Similarly, in his article explaining the overpayment hypothesis,
Professor Black agreed that Professor Coffee’s suggestion was an option
worth exploring. 104 In particular, scholars have argued for shareholder
voting rights for bidder shareholders in certain acquisitions, such as
transactions over a certain size. 105
Whether shareholder voting can be a tool to address bidder overpayment
is an important empirical question to which finance studies have turned
several times. Section A below addresses the empirical research on voting
and bidder overpayment, including recent literature that strongly suggests
that mandatory voting imposes constraints on acquirer CEOs and can serve
as a deterrent to large value-destroying acquisitions. Section B then
discusses the arguments for shareholder voting in public company
acquisitions. Section C examines the ways to achieve voting rights. Section
C then addresses arguments against shareholder voting.
101. See Black, supra note 14, at 651. For a discussion of litigation agency costs, see
Afsharipour, Shareholders’ Put Option, supra note 26, at 1070-71.
102. See Coffee, Regulating, supra note 14, at 1269–72. While Professor Dent raised
several objections to the shareholder voting proposal put forth by Professor Coffee, he
acknowledged that it would be an improvement to the lack of protection under corporate law
for bidder shareholders. See Dent, supra note 100, at 786–94.
103. See Coffee, Regulating, supra note 14, at 1269.
104. See Black, supra note 14, at 652.
105. See, e.g., Coffee, Regulating, supra note 14, at 1281–82; Hamermesh, supra note
91, at 911.
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A. Empirical Studies of the Effects of Bidder Shareholder Voting
Studies have empirically assessed the effects of shareholder voting in
addressing bidder overpayment and the root causes of overpayment. Several
recent papers provide important insights on whether mandatory shareholder
voting can prevent bidder overpayment.
Most of the research on voting by bidder shareholders in acquisitions has
been conducted on U.S. transactions. Undertaking empirical assessments of
U.S. acquisitions, however, is challenging for multiple reasons. Under U.S.
corporate law rules and listing standards, voting on acquisitions is up to the
bidder’s management, and the management can choose to structure its
acquisition to avoid a vote by bidder shareholders. Management can even
amend the voting rights of bidder shareholders after the announcement of a
deal if it appears that shareholders might oppose the transaction. 106
One of the earliest studies of bidder shareholder approval by Timothy R.
Burch et al. finds that merger proxy votes may provide some monitoring of
management even though approval rates for votes on acquisitions are higher
than other types of shareholder votes. 107 Another early study by Jim Hsieh
and Qinghai Wang suggests that shareholder voting rights could discourage
opportunistic behavior by bidder management. Hsieh and Wang find that
“acquisitions without acquirer shareholder approval are associated with
lower synergistic gains, both in percentage and dollar values.” 108 Their
study also presented evidence that “deals without shareholder voting rights
are associated with worse post-merger stock or operating performance than
those with voting rights. This indicates that the requirements of shareholder
voting help deter management from pursuing mergers that are not favored
by shareholders.” 109 Other working papers, however, do not find much
evidence of the value of bidder shareholder voting. 110
Recently, two working papers on the value of bidder shareholder voting
reached differing results from each other. Paul Mason, Mike Stegemoller
and Steven Utke examine the initial implementation of NASDAQ’s 1989
106. See sources cited supra note 60.
107. See Timothy R. Burch et al., Is Acquiring-Firm Shareholder Approval in Stock-forStock Mergers Perfunctory?, FIN. MGMT., Winter 2004, at 45, 51.
108. Jim Hsieh & Qinghai Wang, Shareholder Voting Rights in Mergers and
Acquisitions 5 (Mar. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://www1.american.edu/academic.
depts/ksb/finance_realestate/rhauswald/seminar/vote_American.pdf.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Ehud Kamar, Does Shareholder Voting on Acquisitions Matter? 2, 4–5
(Am. Law & Econ. Ass'n Annual Meetings, Working Paper No. 64, 2006), http://law.
bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1799&context=alea.
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adoption of the rule requiring a shareholder vote when the bidder issues
20% or more of its stock. 111 Mason et al. find that firms altered the structure
of their transactions to avoid a shareholder vote, often by using seasoned
equity offerings prior to an acquisition announcement.112 Nevertheless,
when examining the performance of acquisitions following the enactment
of the NASDAQ 20% rule, Mason et al. find little evidence that shareholder
voting provides benefits to bidder shareholders. 113
Unlike the Mason et al. study, a study of more recent transactions by Kai
Li, Tingting Liu and J. Wu finds value in bidder shareholder voting. Li et
al. investigate the effects of bidder shareholder voting by comparing deals
subject to a vote with those not subject to a vote in a hand-collected sample
of U.S. stock deals over the period 1995-2015. 114 Li et al. find that bidder
management substitutes stock with cash “to avoid triggering the 20% rule
and hence shareholder voting; and that this maneuver is less likely to take
place when acquirer institutional ownership is high.” 115 The study also
shows that in deals where the vote of bidder shareholders was avoided,
acquirer announcement returns were 3% lower than those requiring
shareholder voting. 116 They point out that “[g]iven that the average acquirer
has a market capitalization of $3.2 billion in the sample, a 3.0% difference
in stock returns around the merger announcement corresponds to a value
111. See Paul Mason et al., The Effect of Shareholder Voting Requirements on Method
of Payment and Performance Outcomes in Acquisitions (Jan. 2, 2017) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2844943.
112. See id. at 6.
113. See id. at 4, 6. One challenge with the study by Mason et al. is that the transactions
that it studies happened almost twenty years ago. Much of this period is prior to significant
development of acquisition-focused case law in the Delaware courts which focuses on
potential conflicts in the sale of a company and thus provides incentives for target boards to
advocate more aggressively for a higher price in sale transactions. See Lyondell Chem. Co.
v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 242 (Del. 2009) (“There is only one Revlon duty—to ‘[get] the best
price for the stockholders at the sale of the company.’”); Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC
Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1993) (stating that a negotiated acquisition is one of
those “rare situations which mandate that a court take a more direct and active role in
overseeing the decisions made and actions taken by directors”); id. at 44 (“In the sale of
control context, the directors must focus on one primary objective—to secure the transaction
offering the best value reasonably available for the stockholders—and they must exercise
their fiduciary duties to further that end.”); In re El Paso Corp. S'holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432,
439 (Del. Ch. 2012); In re Dollar Thrifty S'holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 597 (Del. Ch. 2010).
114. See Kai Li et al., Vote Avoidance and Shareholder Voting in Mergers and
Acquisitions 1-2 (European Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper Series in Fin., Paper No.
481/2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2801580.
115. Id. at 2.
116. Id.
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reduction of over $96 million, an economically significant amount to
acquirer shareholders.” 117 The Li et al. study also finds “a large and
significant jump in acquirer announcement returns at the 20% threshold in
all-stock deals when shareholder voting is mandatory,” and this effect is
concentrated among acquirers with more effective shareholder monitoring
as proxied by high institutional ownership. 118 They argue that “shareholder
voting adds value because it commits acquirer management to make deals
with greater synergies and strengthens its bargaining position against target
management, which prevents overpayment.” 119
Other studies of U.S. transactions indicate that institutional shareholders
value voting rights. For example, Gregor Matyos and Michael Ostrosky
examine the holdings of institutional investors and their returns around
merger announcements and find that although the votes are still
overwhelmingly in favor of the merger, shareholders solely invested in the
acquirer are generally four times more likely to vote against a merger as a
cross-owner. 120 Moreover, studies suggest that, on average, institutional
shareholders value both voting and cash-flow rights. A study by Jennifer E.
Bethel et al. finds that institutional buying before the record dates set for
voting rights increases voting turnout but negatively relates to shareholder
support of the merger. 121
In addition to institutional investors, voting rights may also invite
activity from activist shareholders. In a working paper by Wei Jiang, Tao Li
and Danqing Mei, the authors study forty-seven deals between 2000 and
2014 where bidder shareholders had voting rights. 122 According to the
study, activists targeted stock deals that on average were much larger in
size, so-called mega-deals, and deals that involved multiple bidders at
announcement. 123 In these transactions, activist shareholders were able to
lower the premium paid to the target company and even block the

117. Id.
118. Id. at 26.
119. Id.
120. See Gregor Matvos & Michael Ostrovsky, Cross-Ownership, Returns, and Voting in
Mergers, 89 J. FIN. ECON. 391, 399 (2008).
121. See Jennifer E. Bethel et al., The Market for Shareholder Voting Rights Around
Mergers and Acquisitions: Evidence from Institutional Daily Trading and Voting, 15 J.
CORP. FIN. 129, 131 (2009).
122. See Wei Jiang et al., Influencing Control: Jawboning in Risk Arbitrage 6, 9-10
(Columbia Bus. Sch. Research Paper No. 15-41, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2587925.
123. For an explanation of bidder shareholder rights in large stock deals, see supra notes
68-69 and accompanying text.
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acquisition altogether. 124 The authors posit that “[t]o the extent that a large
number of acquisitions of public targets seem to be value destructive for
acquirer shareholders, especially when compounded with weak
governance . . . , activist arbitrageurs on the acquirer side constitute a
powerful counterbalance.” 125
An important recently published study on the value of bidder shareholder
voting rights was conducted by Becht, Polo and Rossi, focusing on
acquisition transactions in the U.K. 126 Unlike the United States, where there
is little bidder shareholder involvement in acquisition transactions, for large
acquisitions in the U.K., shareholder voting is both mandatory and
binding. 127 For shareholders of listed companies, Listing Rule 10 of the
United Kingdom Financial Conduct Authority requires prior approval from
shareholders of the acquirer in transactions that are large relative to the
acquirer (Class 1 transactions). 128 The U.K. listing rules use several tests to
measure relative size to determine a Class 1 transaction.129 “Each test
employs a different measure of relative size.”130 A deal that equals or
exceeds the 25% threshold in any one of these tests must obtain a vote from
shareholders of the acquirer, while any transaction under this 25% threshold
will not require shareholder voting. 131 Reviewing a large sample of U.K.
transactions over an eighteen-year period, Becht et al. find that the U.K.’s
mandatory voting requirement positively impacts bidder shareholders. 132
More specifically, the study finds that shareholders gain eight cents per
dollar at the announcement of a Class 1 deal, or $13.6 billion over 19922010 in aggregate. 133 In the U.K., relatively smaller Class 2 transactions do
not require a vote, and shareholders lost $3 billion. 134 Becht et al. argue that
124. See Jiang et al., supra note 122 at 6, 32.
125. Id. at 6.
126. See Becht et al., supra note 23, at 3037.
127. See id.
128. See FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY HANDBOOK, at Listing Rule 10 (2017) (U.K.),
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/LR/10.pdf [hereinafter FCA HANDBOOK].
129. See id. at Listing Rule 10.2.1, 10 Annex 1; Becht et al., supra note 23, at 3041–42.
A class 1 transaction refers to a transaction that amounts to 25% or more of any of the
acquirer’s gross assets, profits, or gross capital, or in which the consideration is 25% or more
of the market capitalization of the acquirer’s common stock. FCA HANDBOOK, supra note
128, at Listing Rule 10.2.2, 10 Annex 1.
130. Becht et al., supra note 23, at 3037.
131. See FCA HANDBOOK, supra note 128, at Listing Rule 10.2.2; Becht et al., supra note
23, at 3037.
132. See Becht et al., supra note 23, at 3035, 3039.
133. Id. at 3035, 3050.
134. See id.
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mandatory voting makes bidder management more likely to refrain from
overpaying or proposing deals that are not in the interest of shareholders.135
Interestingly, Becht et al. find that the mandatory voting mechanism
works as a credible threat against bad corporate acquisitions because
shareholders never voted against Class 1 transactions ex-post, and deals that
were poorly received by the market at announcement were often withdrawn
prior to the shareholder vote. 136 Together with the study of U.S. transactions
by Li et al., the study by Becht et al. provides important empirical support
for greater consideration of shareholder voting rights by bidder
shareholders.
B. Why Voting Rights for Bidder Shareholders?
Voting by shareholders “has come roaring back as a key part of
American corporate governance.” 137 Several important developments have
led to the rise of shareholder voting: (1) government regulations that
“require many institutions to vote their stock in the best interests of their
beneficiaries”; (2) the emergence and increasing importance of proxy
advisory firms, “which help address the costs of voting and the collective
action problems inherent in coordinated institutional shareholder action”;
and (3) the increasingly important corporate governance role played by
activist investors, such as hedge funds, which has led to greater use of the
ballot box and the accompanying result of greater institutional shareholder
engagement with voting rights. 138
Edelman et al. set forth important theoretical support for shareholder
voting rights, arguing that “shareholder voting should lead to valuemaximizing decisions for the firm as a whole,” 139 an insight that is
supported by the recent empirical research discussed in Section A above.
They acknowledge that shareholders should not vote on routine decisions
by management or the board of directors. 140 Rather, they argue that a vote
by shareholders can serve a “monitoring role if the issue being decided
affects the company's stock price, or long-term value, and if the shareholder
vote is likely to be superior, or complementary, to monitoring by the board
or the market.” 141 As they note, the supplemental monitoring role is
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

See id. at 3061–62.
See id. at 3063–64.
Edelman et al., supra note 16, at 1359.
Id. at 1361.
See id. at 3063–64.
See id. at 1363, 1367.
Id. at 1363.
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especially significant when “officers or directors of the company suffer
from a conflict of interest, or may otherwise be seeking private benefits at
the expense of the firm.” 142 These soft conflicts, agency problems, and
biases are the exact types of situations that research indicates are implicated
in significant acquisition decisions by public companies. 143
Two arguments against bidder shareholder voting rights in acquisition
transactions relate to the cost of the vote as well as to concerns about the
value of shareholder decisions. Voting is costly and uncertain, especially in
a significant transaction, and could potentially lead to additional deal
risk. 144 Voting rights may also not result in shareholders making an
informed decision, especially if shareholders are apathetic and/or suffer
from collective action problems. 145
The above arguments against shareholder voting are tempered by the rise
of institutional investors.146 Institutional investors have significant voting
power since they own a majority of the shares of publicly traded
companies. 147 The significant change in ownership of U.S. public
companies, resulting in a greater concentration of ownership in the hands of
institutional shareholders,148 makes voting by bidder shareholders in large
public company transactions much more palatable. The “[i]ncreased
concentration of shareholding makes shareholder activism more rational,
making it easier for shareholders to surmount the classic collective action
problem that forms the basis for much of corp
orate law, namely, the problem facing dispersed shareholders in
disciplining management.” 149 Their large ownership stake coupled with the
increasing influence of other market participants, such as hedge funds and

142. Id.
143. See id. at 1363, 1378.
144. See Langevoort, The Behavioral, supra note 48, at 75.
145. See id. at 69, 75-76.
146. See Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm
Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1741 (2008) (“[H]edge funds may attempt to play an activist
role in a pending merger or acquisition generally by asking for a better price . . . or by trying
to stop the pending acquisition.”).
147. See Fisch, Standing Voting Instructions, supra note 20, at 10.
148. See Edelman et al., supra note 16, at 1386-88. See generally Ronald J. Gilson &
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the
Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM L. REV. 863 (2013).
149. Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 452 (1991); see also Fisch, Standing Voting
Instructions, supra note 20, at 11-12 (recounting various regulatory developments which led
to greater institutional investor attention to exercising their voting rights).
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proxy advisory firms, may mean that institutional investors have strong
economic and political interests in monitoring management’s decisions via
voting. 150 Moreover, voting rights may invite interference from activists
that focus on deals that may be risky or more prone to overpayment. 151
Even the threat of monitoring by institutional shareholders may be
enough to address the bidder overpayment problem and its underlying
causes. One argument against voting rights for bidder shareholders has been
the significant transaction costs and deal uncertainty involved in providing
the right. 152 Becht et al., however, found that voting served as a deterrent to
and constraint on overpayment, and in their sample, shareholders never
voted against Class 1 transactions following announcement of the deal. 153
In essence, “the mere prospect of the vote,” rather than the actual vote
itself, plays an important role in management calculations about the
acquisition. 154 Becht et al. also found “little evidence that the deal flow is
affected by shareholder approval.” 155
Shareholder voting rights also implicate director primacy. 156 Several
scholars contend that deference to board decisions is both optimal and
desirable. 157 Stephen M. Bainbridge argues, for example, that “[i]n general
shareholders of public corporations have neither the legal right, the
practical ability, nor the desire to exercise the kind of control necessary for
meaningful monitoring of the corporation’s agents.” 158 But while board
primacy may have some academic appeal, the argument is overstated. 159
Directors are not often the initiators or the driving force behind decisions to
acquire another company; instead their primary role in acquisitions is to
150. See Edelman et al., supra note 16, at 1401, 1418; Fisch, Standing Voting
Instructions, supra note 20, at 12-13.
151. See supra notes 122-125 and accompanying text.
152. Langevoort, The Behavioral, supra note 48, at 75.
153. See Becht et al., supra note 23, at 3061, 3063–64.
154. Id. at 3050.
155. Id. at 3064.
156. Professor Bainbridge has long advocated for the value of the primacy of the board,
including in acquisition decisions. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and
Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1746-51 (2006); see also Margaret
M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV.
247, 251-55 (1999).
157. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003).
158. Id. at 568.
159. See generally Robert B. Thompson, Anti-Primacy: Sharing Power in American
Corporations, 71 BUS. LAW. 381 (2016) (arguing that corporate governance is best
understood as a shared power among shareholders, directors and officers).
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monitor management who are “the key decision makers in corporate
decisions, a point that reflects the influence of market and economic
realities more than a command from law.” 160 Moreover, with respect to
acquisition decisions, board primacy arguments fail to consider the vast
empirical literature that suggests that boards, when confronted by
management’s soft conflicts and behavioral biases in significant acquisition
decisions, need the assistance of an additional monitor or check.
So why have shareholders not advocated for voting rights in large
acquisition transactions? Several reasons come to mind. First, large public
company acquisitions often occur when companies are doing well and not
when they are the target of shareholder advocates. Second, institutional
shareholders have not always been strong governance advocates as a whole,
especially without some pressure from more activist investors. 161 And
activist investors have little incentive to get involved in acquisition
transactions if they do not have rights that can provide them with an ability
to hold up the transaction.162 Moreover, acquisition activity tends to come
in waves, and by the time the significance of overpayment by bidders
becomes readily apparent, acquisitions may be on a downward trend,
making the issue appear less salient to shareholder activists.
In sum, the argument for shareholder voice in significant public company
acquisition decisions is not an argument for shareholder voting rights in all
transactions, but rather an argument for shareholder voice in situations of
high importance to firm value and share price, and where empirical inquiry
seems to consistently demonstrate shortcomings in the board’s monitoring
role. 163
C. Achieving Voting Rights for Bidder Shareholders
There are several ways to achieve voting rights for bidder shareholders in
significant transactions. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to
detail in full the costs, benefits, and feasibility of each of these ways, this
section explores some of the general methods by which voting rights could
be provided to bidder shareholders in significant acquisitions.
One way to provide bidder shareholders with voting rights in large
public company acquisitions is through amendment of stock exchange
rules, akin to the listing rules adopted in the United Kingdom. Such an
160. Id. at 404.
161. See generally Gilson & Gordon, supra note 148.
162. For an example of activist bidder shareholder activity, see Jiang et al., supra note
122, at 58–59.
163. See Edelman et al., supra note 16, at 1374–75.
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amendment would necessarily require significant advocacy by organized
institutional investors. Advocacy of voting rights for bidder shareholders by
institutional investors is not out of the realm of possibility. As scholars have
observed, “the provision of finance through institutional investors . . . will
produce investor groups that are better organized and more sophisticated in
their inputs into the lawmaking process.”164 Shareholder voting has become
increasingly important and more common over the past decade. 165 Any
amendment in listing rules to provide bidder shareholders with voting rights
will likely be vociferously opposed by corporate managers and their
advocates who have expressed deep reservations about greater shareholder
power and say. 166 Nevertheless, the greater voices of activists and
institutional investors in public debates about corporate governance could
be an important lever to pressure the U.S. stock exchanges to at least
consider a debate over a voting rule for significant transactions in line with
the U.K. listing rules. 167
Private ordering could be another solution for providing voting rights to
bidder shareholders. Shareholders could advocate for either advisory votes
or binding votes (through a charter or bylaw amendment) on significant
public company acquisitions. 168 Corporate charters and bylaws are often
viewed as intra-corporate contracts. 169 It is possible that shareholders could

164. John Armour et al., The Evolution of Hostile Takeover Regimes in Developed and
Emerging Markets: An Analytical Framework, 52 HARV. INT'L L.J. 219, 225 (2011).
165. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 148, at 897; see also Fisch, Standing Voting
Instructions, supra note 20, at 4 (explaining the increasing range of issues on which
shareholders vote).
166. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Deconstructing American Business II, BRIEFLY . . . PERSP.
ON LEGIS. REG. & LITIG., Dec. 2006, at 1, 1–5.
167. Institutional shareholder voice has played an important role, for example, in the
more shareholder-protective regime of the U.K. takeover code. See generally John Armour
& David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why?—The
Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L.J. 1727 (2007); see
also Armour et al., supra note 164, at 265–66.
168. See generally Jill E. Fisch, Governance by Contract: The Implications for
Corporate Bylaws, 106 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 2-3),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2930529 [hereinafter Fisch, Governance by Contract] (stating that
“corporate participants are using private ordering to customize their corporate governance by
adopting issuer-specific terms.”).
169. See Fisch, Governance by Contract, supra note 168, at 7, 9; see also Boilermakers
Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939 (Del. Ch. 2013) (stating that
“the bylaws of a Delaware corporation constitute part of a binding broader contract among
the directors, officers, and stockholders formed within the statutory framework of the
DGCL.”).
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advocate for corporate governance related voting rights to be encompassed
within these contracts. 170 As scholars have noted, however, a “charter
amendment would require board approval and therefore the same frictions
that explain the negative returns for acquirer shareholders—overconfidence
and moral hazard—might explain why we do not see such charter
amendments.” 171 With respect to bylaws, the “scope of potential
governance bylaws is very broad.” 172 While there is some question about
whether a mandatory shareholder vote for significant acquisitions via
bylaws would be permissible under Delaware law, 173 a bylaw which only
provides a shareholder advisory vote for significant acquisitions may be
less problematic as it would address the procedure by which the acquisition
decision is made but would leave the board with final authority over the
acquisition transaction.174 Conceivably, shareholder advocacy, even for
advisory votes in significant acquisitions, could play an important
governance role and may eventually lead to more mandatory provisions.175
In the relatively recent past, for example, advocacy by shareholders on
issues such as majority voting for directors has resulted in boards
voluntarily adopting majority voting regimes, as well as significant
legislative changes in corporate law. 176
IV. Conclusion
Large public company acquisitions often destroy value for the acquiring
firm. Empirical literature suggests that the bidder overpayment problem is
driven by behavioral biases of the bidder’s management or soft conflicts of
170. See Verity Winship, Shareholder Litigation by Contract, 96 B.U. L. REV. 485, 497
(2016).
171. Becht et al., supra note 23, at 3064; see Fisch, Governance by Contract, supra note
168, at 7 n. 33.
172. See Fisch, Governance by Contract, supra note 168, at 8.
173. Whether changes in bylaws could effectively provide shareholders a voice in
acquisition decisions would likely be subject to debate since bylaws are often viewed by
courts as “procedural” and “process-oriented.” See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension
Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 235 (Del. 2008); Fisch, Governance by Contract, supra note 168, at 1920. There is some tension between the AFSCME case and other decisions of Delaware courts
which have been much more open to the shareholders’ powers to amend bylaws. See Fisch,
Governance by Contract, supra note 168, at 4.
174. See Fisch, Governance by Contract, supra note 168, at 16.
175. See Edelman et al., supra note 16, at 1369; see also Fisch, Governance by Contract,
supra note 168, at 24 (arguing that proxy advisory firms have increased the focus on “board
failures to respond to shareholder demands).
176. See Armour et al., supra note 164, at 268.
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interests on the part of bidder management where management seeks to
extract private benefits from the deal. Several recent empirical studies
suggest that voting rights for bidder shareholders in significant acquisition
transactions will play an important role in reducing value-destructive
acquisitions. This article argues that it is time for corporate law to respond
to this literature and reassess bidder shareholder voting rights.
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